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PROVISIONS IN A DEED TO BUILD AND MAIN-
TAIN FENCES AS COVENANTS RUN-
NING WITH THE LAND.
Various attempts have been made to divide all covenants
into two classes, real and personal, in such a manner that the defini-
tion of real covenants would include all those that concern the
realty and run with the land, while all covenants enforceable only
against the promisor or his estate would fall within the definition
of personal covenants.' In a few familiar cases, as where there
is a covenant against waste, or one to maintain fences already built,
or on the other hand where there is a covenant for quiet enjoyment
or of warranty, there is no difficulty in determining that the cove-
nant runs with the land, for it must do so to be effectual. "Such
covenants, and such only," says Mr. Washburn, "run with the
land as concern the land itself, in whatsoever hands it may be and
become united with, and form a part of the consideration for which
the land or some interest in it is parted with between covenantor
and covenantee."'  Mr. Tiedman describes a covenant running
with the land as one which must "bear an intimate relation with,
and concern the estate or lands conveyed. It runs with the land
when the performance of it is expressly or by implication made a
charge upon the land." ' 3 Again in Vyvyan vs. Arthur, Justice
Best said: "If the performance of the covenant be beneficial to
the reversioner in respect to the lessor's demand, and to no other
person, his assignee may sue on it, but if it be beneficial to the
lessor without regard to his continuing owner of the estate, it is a
mere collateral subject upon which the assignee cannot sue." '4
Finally, Justice Gould says that covenants run with the land where
"the covenants are in the very conveyance by which the covenantor
acquired the land, the performance of such coveyants plainly form-
ing a part of the consideration without which the conveyance would
not have been made."'
It would appear that to some minds the principal question
to be determined is whether the subject matter of the covenant
17 R. C. L. Covenants, sec. 27.
211 Washburn on Real Prop., p. 263.
3Tiedman on Real Prop., Sec. 626.
4Vyvyan vs. Arthur, I. B. and C 410.
'Van Rensselaer vs. Smith, 5 B and Aid. I.
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forms a part of the land or relates to the realty, while in the minds
of others the principal question is one of consideration,-whether
in assigning the land the covenant was part of the consideration.
It would seem however, that this difference is mostly in point of
view, and that both the statements mean practically the same thing,
since to be a part of the consideration, when the land is the consider-
ation, it must also be a part of the land. However, no one of these
definitions covers all the requisites of a covenant running with the land.
In order that a covenant shall run with the land there must be a
privity of estate between covenantor and covenantee, but this rela-
tion need not be that of landlord and tenant. An interest in the
nature of an easement in the land which the covenant purports to
bind, whether already existing, or created by the very deed which
contains the covenant, constitutes a sufficient privity of estate to
make a burden of the covenant to do certain acts upon the land, for
the support and protection of that interest, run with the land.'
The covenant to build and maintain fences, found very fre-
quently in America, has caused the courts considerable difficulty.
While the well-known decision in Spencer's Case goes on a general
principle now well established both in America and in England
-that when a covenant relates to a thing not in being the covenant
must expressly be on the part of the covenantor, his assigns or
successors, in order that the covenant shall run with the land and
bind the covenantor's assignee, but the particular conclusions have
not proven in accord with modem public policy. In this case
Spencer and his wife sued the final assignee of their lessee who had
agreed on behalf of himself, his executors and administratdrs, that
a wall would be built on part of the land demised. The court held
that when the covenant extends to a thing in esse, parcel of the
demise, the thing to be done by force of the covenant is quodammodo
annexed and appurtenant to the land demised, and shall go with
the land and bind the assignees, although they be not named in
express words, but if the thing is to be newly built thereafter it
shall bind the covenantor, his administrators or executors, but not
his assignee, for the law will not annex the covenant to a thing
not in being. On the other hand they held that if the lessee had
covenanted for himself and his assigns that they would build the
wall, that since it was to be built on the very land demised, the
assignee would be bound. In other words the court held that since
5Bronson vs. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175; Boyley vs. Tanlyn, 6 B and C, 329;
Hazlett vs. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488.
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the demis concerned a thing not in being when the demise was
made, and the word assigns did not appear in the covenant, that
the covenant did not run with the land so as to bind Clark, the
defendant assignee.
The decision in Spencer's case has been freely criticized by both
in England and in this country, and the courts in considering cove-
nants for fencing and keeping the fences in repair, have either
ignored the decision or said that it did not apply. There is a ten-
dency to resort to the probable intention of the parties to the deed
when there is any possibility for doubt. In a case where there was
a covenant to build and maintain perpetually, for instance, the
word "perpetually" was held to mean that the parties to the deed
intended the covenant to run with the land. Another rule of con-
struction which has been adopted is to construe the covenant as in
accord with "public policy." There are a number of clear decisions
to the effect that a provision to maintain fences is a covenant run-
ning with the land and not a personal covenant, and in some of
these cases the fences were not built. The attempts of such courts
to reconcile their decisions with the principle of law above stated,
-that unless a thing is in being at the time of making the deed the
covenant will not bind the assignee, unless he be expressly named,
have catised conflicting rules of law. Of the decisions, Sexaner vs.
Wilson,7 (Iowa), and Kellog vs. Robertson, (Vermont), appear to
be the clearest cases, the judges in these cases dealing with pro-
visions to maintain fences as well as provisions to build and 'Main-
tain. While it would appear that a fence to be built must be con-
sidered as a thing not in being, the courts nevertheless say that
since such a provision relates to the land, and the land is in being,
and the fence when built must become part of the land, that the rule
concerning things in being need not be applied. In the Iowa case
the court says that the maintenance of fences being undoubtedly
necessary to the enjoyment of the estate, that the important test,
whether the covenant concerns the land or not,-being satisfied,
the presence of the word "assigns," in the deed becomes unnecessary.
Yet another theory has been advanced which undoubtedly sup-
'Harting vs. Witte, 59 Wis. 294; Hansem vs. Meyer, 81 Ill. 31; Tallmany vs.
Coffin, 4 N. Y. 13 1; Woodruff vs. Trenton Water Power Co., 10 N. S. Eq. 506.
8Kellog vs. Robinson, 6 Vt. 276; Hazlett vs. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488; Brown vs.
Southern P. Co., 47 L. R. A. 409; Easter vs. Little Miami R. R. Co., 14 Ohio St.
48; Borbank vs. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 475; Bronson vs. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175;
Sexauer vs. Wilson, 136 La. 357, 142 R. A. ns. 185; 7 Ruling Case Law Cove-
nants, Sec. 24; 11 Ruling Case Law,Fences, Sec. 14; Bally vs. Wells, 3 Wils, 25.
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ports the enforcement of covenants to maintain fences not in being
at the time of the demise. It is said that if the fence be erected
subsequently, then the provision to maintain or repair relates to
something then in being and runs with the land.
Taking the other side of the controversy the court in Hartung
vs. Witte,9 refused to follow these theories and held that a provision
to build a fence was similar to a provision to built a house, and could
not run with the land because the thing was not in existence, con-
ceding however, that a provision to maintain a fence after it should
be built would not be open to the same objection.
R. W. F.
OHartung vs. Witte, 39 Wis. 285.
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